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Abstract
We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Al-
though such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust
authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We
identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also
examine the traditional RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) licens-
ingcondition. Wesuggestformation, licensingandrentdistributionmethods
more conducive to a successful patent pool operation.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we examine the current practices of a patent pool that is part of a
consortium standard. A consortium standard is a collaborative venture of ﬁrms
to promote a new technical standard. It can eventually be adopted by national or
international standard setting bodies (a de jure standard) or become the de facto
standard after winning the competition with other possible standards. A collab-
orative approach to standardization has become essential in the information and
communication technology areas where speed of innovation and the world wide
reach of the technologies have made compatibility and early establishment of a
standard critical. Consortium standard is distinguished from a standard sponsored
by a single ﬁrm in the following two respects. First, it involves multiple ﬁrms
with different interests. Second, it adopts open licensing policy through its com-
mitment to standard bodies such as ITU and ISO. Since a majority of the recent
standards involve proprietary standards, patent pools have become an essential
feature of consortiums. We look at the two sides of a patent pool: interactions
among members and with users of the technology. A list of recent successful
consortiums provided in Appendix 1.
Sincesuchaconsortiumofteninvolvescollaborationamongcompetitors, there
is the question of how such collaboration can be designed to avoid becoming an
anti-competitive device. The Cournot-Shapiro effect (Shapiro (2001)) means it is
socially beneﬁcial to bundle complementary patents. Recognizing this fact, the
U.S. antitrust authority has stated that a patent pool of essential patents are not an-
ticompetitive.1 A patent is essential to a standard if the standard is not possible to
implement without the infringing patented technology. Thus essential patents for
a particular standard are always complementary implying it is socially desirable
to have the set of patents form a pools and be licensed as a bundle.
Bundling patents has additional dynamic beneﬁcial properties when they are
1See Klein (1997) for the recent articulation of the policy of the US antitrust authority toward
patent pools. See Gilbert (2002) and Priest (1977) for a historical overview of the U.S. policy
toward patent pools.
1part of a standard. Bundling improves not only consumer welfare but also the
competitive position of a consortium standard relative to the standard controlled
by a single ﬁrm. (See Nalebuff (2000) for a potentially huge competitive disad-
vantage of uncoordinated pricing of complements.) Second, the joint proﬁt of
ﬁrms is larger when the patents are bundled, since the unbundled prices exceed
the proﬁt maximizing price. Thus return from R&D investment will be greater
when patents are bundled.
The Cournot-Shapiro analysis assumes strong complementarity of the tech-
nologies. That is, it is assumed that a user of the standard is willing to use each
technology, even if each patent holder exercises its market power individually.
A user, however, may choose not to use all of the technologies if the prices of
the technologies are high. In this case, price of some technologies are subject
to internal competition, in the sense that it is determined based on the maximum
value which a user can obtain without using a speciﬁc patent (competition margin
binds, according to the term used by Lerner and Tirole (2003)). However, as long
as there is one or more “essential” patents which a user must employ in using that
standard, individual uncoordinated pricing of technologies still results in exces-
sive pricing due to double or more marginalization, and coordination of pricing
results in lower price and higher joint proﬁt of ﬁrms. Moreover, as shown by
Lerner and Tirole (2003), the opportunities for an licensee to have an independent
licensing contract with each patentee will help screen out the bundles of patents
with the effect of price increase.
Efﬁcientcollaborationamongtheholderswithcomplementarypatents, includ-
ing an adoption of free licensing policy with respect to a particular standard body,
can increase the consumers’ welfare as well as the R&D proﬁtability of the ﬁrms.
However, such collaboration does not necessarily occur. An outsider of the patent
pool can emerge, who does not join in the pool and licenses an essential patent
independently from the pool. Although such a licensor may be still subject to the
RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) conditions when it has participated in
the standard development, his licensing term is not bound by the licensing policy
2of the patent pool. In the worst case, a “submarine” patent may emerge after the
adoption of the standard, as was the case of the Lemelson patent for the fax ma-
chine. The outsider who suddenly surfaces can charge whatever the market bears,
causing the hold-up problem in addition to double marginalization. Another pos-
sibility is that a patent pool for a single standard may split, so that a licensee must
obtain licenses separately from two or more group of the patentees. In the case
of the DVD patent pool, a ﬁrm must obtain at least two independent licenses, one
each from the 3C group and the 6C group. Such breakdown of an integrated patent
pool not only raises the total price to be paid by licensees but also reduces the joint
proﬁt of the patentees.
The question is why we see the expected or un-expected emergence of an
outsider and the split of the patent pool. In the next two sections we identify
two major sources: free rider problem and bargaining failure due to heterogenous
membership.
In Section 4 we focus on how a patent pool interacts with its users. In par-
ticular we examine the effectiveness of RAND as part of the consortium stan-
dard. Standard setting organizations which are willing to accommodate standards
with non-free patents require the ﬁrms to commit themselves to licensing un-
der RAND conditions (i.e., licensing under reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms) for members of the organizations and often for the general public.2 How-
ever, the economic rationale of RAND conditions has not been explicitly spec-
iﬁed and there are many ambiguities on what they mean. We analyze whether
non-discriminatory licensing ensures ex-post efﬁciency and whether there are any
good grounds for the government (e.g., competition policy authority) to control
the level of royalty, simply because it is coordinated price.
2There is an example of a standard body which maintains free IPR policy such as W3C. See
Lemley (2002) for a comprehensive review of licensing policies of standard bodies.
32 The Free Rider Problem
First we introduce the basic framework. A ﬁrm that receives the licenses of all the
patents necessary to implement the technology for royalty ci for i-th patent will
pay total of
P
i ci. Firm k’s optimal output qk(
P







where γ is the non-license marginal cost and Pk(q,q−k) is ﬁrm k’s inverse demand
function given other ﬁrms are producing q−k = (q1,··· ,qk−1,qk+1,···qn)4 when











Because the patents are essential, this is also the demand for any one of the es-
sential patents as well as demand for the bundle if the patents are bundled. We
assume that q0 < 0 and q0 + cq00 ≤ 0. When the patents are priced as a bundle by




The incentive to remain an outsider or split away from a pool can be illus-
trated using Figure 1 where c0 represents the license royalty set by a pool and
c1 the royalty set by an outsider. The reaction curve R0(c1) shows how the pool’s
proﬁt(c0(q(c1+c0))maximizingroyaltychangesastheoutsider’sroyaltychanges.
Since q0 + cq00 ≤ 0, it satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition,
q(c0 + c1) + c0q
0(c0 + c1) = 0. (1)
3For instance, if the product market is a Cournot duopoly with linear demand 1 − Q, Q, total
output, then qk(
P
i ci + γ) = (1 −
P
i ci − 2γ + γ0)/3 where γ and γ0 are this ﬁrm and rival’s
respective ﬁrm speciﬁc non-license marginal costs.
4We write Pk(q,q−k) for generality, including heterogenous goods. If ﬁrms produced homoge-
nous goods, then q−k =
Pn
j=1,j6=k qj.
4The reaction curve is negatively sloped since the patents are complementary. Sim-
ilarly, the reaction curve R1(c0) shows how the royalty of the outsider changes as
the pool royalty changes. This satisﬁes
q(c1 + c0) + c1q
0(c1 + c0) = 0. (2)
Since all patents (pool’s and outsider’s) are essential, two curves are entirely sym-
metric, irrespective of the relative number of the patents held by the pool and the
outsider. The intersection is a Nash equilibrium (cN
1 ,cN
0 ) (Point N in Figure 1.),
which gives the outsider and the pool equal revenues since cN
1 = cN
0 . The iso-
proﬁt curve at the Nash equilibrium is denoted πN
1 .
If the outsider joins the pool, the new pool royalty c∗ that maximizes pool






Equations (1) and (2) implies q(cN
1 + cN















We can ﬁnd the outsider’s iso-proﬁt curve when it becomes a pool member by
identifying the appropriate point on the line c0 + c1 = c∗. If there are n members
(including the outsider) in the pool, the relevant point is C where c1 = c∗
n since
the outsider’s share of pool revenue is 1
n. The corresponding iso-proﬁt curve is
π0
1 in Figure 1 (assumes n ≥ 3). As a result of the integration of the outsider,
royalty would fall and the joint proﬁt would rise. However, if the pool’s proﬁt
is distributed evenly among its members, the proﬁt of the outsider is most likely
to fall signiﬁcantly, especially when the number of the pool membership is large.
(The point C moves south east along c1 + c0 = c∗ as n increases).
Thus, not joining the pool is proﬁtable as a unilateral conduct. The disin-
5centive for joining the pool increases as the number of complementary patents
increases, since the proﬁt share of a particular member of the patent pool declines
while what it can collect as an outsider increases with the value of the standard. 5
The incentive to license independently as identiﬁed above is due to the free
rider problem. Free rider problem arises when access to the good is not exclud-
able, that is, it is a public good. In the case of a patent pool that supports a
standard, the public good is not the technology, since they are patented and access
to them can be controlled. The public good here is the demand for the standard.
The outsider which has an essential patent related to the standard does not need
permission from the other suppliers of the standard technologies to impose royalty
on the users of the standard technology. If the outsider is also a user of the stan-
dard technology, his access to the demand can be controlled indirectly through
licensing policy of the pool members. That is, the pool members can demand
reciprocity in licensing to the outsider ﬁrm. It is important to note that the DOJ
explicitly allows such clause as a device to support the viability of a patent pool
against outsiders in its business review letter. However, such a clause is not effec-
tive at all on those outsiders who are specialized in licensing with respect to that
standard.
A possible solution to this problem is to use the stage of choosing the stan-
dard as an opportunity to commit to a licensing through a patent pool. That is,
a ﬁrm with an essential patent to the proposed standard is asked to disclose its
willingness to license its patent collectively, not just its willingness to license its
patent on the RAND conditions or for free on the reciprocity basis. In particular,
a standard body can ask a ﬁrm with an essential patent holder to disclose whether
it is:
1. Willing to license its essential patent for free on the reciprocity basis.
2. WillingtolicenseitsessentialpatentonRANDconditionsonthereciprocity
5The above analysis assumed the Nash equilibrium of simultaneous pricing by the pool and
the outsider. It is possible that the outsider moves ﬁrst in price setting, since there is a ﬁrst mover
advantage. This is explored in Section 3.
6basis.
3. Willing to license its essential patent on RAND conditions and collectively
on the reciprocity basis.
A ﬁrm with an essential patent may commit itself to licensing through a patent
pool (i.e. submitting the third patent statement), since otherwise a standard body
may elect to choose an alternative standard, since the users of the standard will
foresee a relatively high price of such standard due to double marginalization. If
on the other hand, the standard is a unique one so that it has a substantial market
power, a ﬁrm may still not commit to the collective licensing.
3 Heterogenous Membership
In this section we analyze the bargaining failure inherent in patent pools and ex-
plore possible solutions. Coalition formation literature has shown that even with
open membership, the grand coalition may not form in equilibrium when there
is asymmetry among ﬁrms (Belleﬂamme (2000)). We do note that the premises
of his analysis is quite speciﬁc (ﬁrms are Cournot competitors and coalitions re-
duce marginal costs), not applicable to extent of asymmetry in our analysis. A
simulation analysis by Axelrod et al. (1995) of the UNIX operating standard also
demonstrates fragmentation from heterogeneity. Together with the Belleﬂamme
result, we suspect a similar heterogeneity from preventing some ﬁrms to join the
patent pool.
To demonstrate we extend the basic model to three types of ﬁrms that differ
by vertical structure: insider manufacturing V-ﬁrm (vertically integrated ﬁrm),
outsider manufacturing M-ﬁrm, and insider research R-ﬁrm. Insider means a ﬁrm
in the patent pool, which collects speciﬁc royalty c from licensees. The patent
pool has only 2 members, V and R ﬁrms, each of which has an essential patent.
There are two licensees, V and M ﬁrms which produce very different products:
each ﬁrm produces as a monopolist in respective separate but identical markets.
7This allows as to focus only on signiﬁcance of vertical structure of ﬁrms.6 Using
the initial basic formulation, ﬁrm k’s inverse demand is,
Pk(q,q−k) = P(q),
for any k. When the (total) royalty is c, M-ﬁrm always produces the monopoly
output when marginal cost is c, denoted qM(c).
Patent Pool and Independent Licensing
When there is a patent pool charging the bundle price c, V-ﬁrm chooses output q
to maximize,














The V-ﬁrm produces as if the marginal cost were c
2. We denote the maximum
proﬁt achieved with q = qV(c) by πV(c).





The pool sets royalty to maximize pool revenue c(qV(c) + qM(c)). This also max-
imizes patent R-ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
When ﬁrms license independently, V-ﬁrm chooses cV and q simultaneously to
maximize its proﬁt. It is equivalent to maximizing7
πV = (P(qM(cR)) − cR)qM(cR) + qM(cV + cR)cV,
6There is no market interaction between M and V ﬁrms: V-ﬁrm has no incentive to raise royalty
to raise rival’s cost. See end of this section for details.
7V-ﬁrm’s royalty revenue comes only from the M-ﬁrm and does not include own output. So
V-ﬁrm chooses output equal to the monopoly output when marginal cost is cR.
8and R-ﬁrm chooses cR to maximize
πR = (qV(cR) + qM(cR + cV))cR.
This is a non-cooperative game where the ﬁrms choose royalty (ﬁrm’s strategy)
simultaneously.
The following proposition characterizes the relationship between royalty set
by a patent pool and royalties set independently.
Proposition 1. When c∗, π∗
R, π∗
V are the patent pool revenue maximizing royalty
and proﬁts, and ˆ cR, ˆ cV, ˆ πR, ˆ πV are equilibrium royalties and proﬁts when R- and
V-ﬁrms set them independently, then
(i) c








V, ˆ πV < ˆ π
∗
V.
The proposition is summarized in Figure 2. (The proof is in Appendix 2.)
βV and βR are best-response correspondences and are downward sloping since
the royalties are strategic substitutes. R-ﬁrm’s response correspondence is steeper
because its royalty effects outputs of both M- and V-ﬁrms. V-ﬁrm only gets rev-
enue from M-ﬁrm. Thus for the same increase of rival royalty, R-ﬁrms reduces its
royalty. Both ﬁrms charge the same royalty, cm, if it were the sole licensor, equiv-
alent to 0 rival royalty.8 This implies the Nash equilibrium (point IE) must be
under the 45 degree line (cR = cV), i.e., ˆ cR > ˆ cV. A ﬁrm’s independent licensing
proﬁt will be the same as patent pool licensing if the royalties were cR = cV = c∗
2
(point RY ). Both ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to unilaterally raise proﬁt from this level
(Cournot-Shapiro effect). This implies c∗ < ˆ cR + ˆ cV.
Since R-ﬁrm’s proﬁt is the same as that of the patent pool revenue, the highest
level along 45 degree line is at c∗ (as drawn in Figure 2). V-ﬁrm’s proﬁt decreases
monotonically in total royalty along the 45 degree line and with rival royalty, cR,
8Exact deﬁnition is in the proof.
9along its own best-response correspondence. This implies ˆ πV < π∗
V. The sum of
R-ﬁrm and V-ﬁrms is
(cR + cV)qM(cR + cV) + P(qV(cR))qV(cR).
The ﬁrst term is decreasing in total royalty in the relevant region and thus is higher
with patent pool royalty c∗. The second term is also decreasing in cR. Thus
aggregate proﬁt will be larger with patent pool royalty c∗. R-ﬁrm’s proﬁt may
be higher or lower by licensing independently. In Figure 2, R-ﬁrm is better-off
(as in the following case of linear demand). But the equilibrium IE may be on
a lower iso-proﬁt line. R-ﬁrm always has incentive to deviate from a patent pool
but independent licensing may make it worse off .
Bargaining Failure
We investigate the relationship further by assuming the product market has linear



























where π(c) = πV(c) + πR(c). Note that the V-ﬁrm has the same incentive as
the M-ﬁrm in that it wants c to be as low as possible. Of course this will not be
desirable for the R-ﬁrm. Although the R-ﬁrm would not like the royalty to be too
high since it reduces demand, it ﬁnds its proﬁt increasing in c when c is small.
That is, πR(c) is increasing in c for c ≤ 2
3 and decreasing for larger c’s.
Wecanhighlightthetrade-offbydrawingacurvein(πR,πV)spacebyplotting
(πR(c),πV(c)) for 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. We will refer to this as the frontier (Figure 3). The
frontier is on the vertical axis when c = 0 since πR(0) = 0. Raising royalty
beneﬁts R-ﬁrm and hurts the V-ﬁrm. However the trade-off is not one to one
because the V-ﬁrm will adjust output. It is downward sloping until c = 2
3. Then it
is upward sloping until the curve ends at (1
8, 1
16) corresponding to c = 1. Making
10royalty too high is not good for both ﬁrms.



























Outputs will be 1
4 each and the total 1
2. This would be most desirable royalty for
the R-ﬁrm. The frontier is vertical at this point. (This is point RY in Figures 2
and 3).
If the pool sets royalty to maximize the joint proﬁt of the V- and R-ﬁrms, π(c),


























This is the point farthest from the origin on the frontier. (This is point PF in
Figure 3).













, ˆ πR =
9
49






R-ﬁrm is better off than the patent pool.





















11R-ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases but V-ﬁrm loses out. This corresponds to point SQ in
Figure 3.
Both points IE and SQ are outside the frontier. Independent licensing is more
attractive to the R-ﬁrm than a patent pool while the V-ﬁrm always prefers the pool.
We also note that revenue maximizing is not the best option for the patent pool as
a whole.
The aggregate proﬁt is largest when c = cPF. Both simultaneous independent
and R ﬁrst mover licensing result in smaller total proﬁt. The total proﬁts are even
lower than with the revenue maximizing royalty, c∗. This means that the V-ﬁrm
would be better off if it give what R-ﬁrm would achieve as a ﬁrst-mover to induce
R-ﬁrm to join the pool. Because point SQ is outside the frontier, this allocation
that guarantees R-ﬁrm enough to join cannot be achieved by splitting the pool
revenue according to patents. It must be achieved in form of a transfer payment.
If V-ﬁrm could commit not to increase output beyond qM(c) = 1−c
2 to qV(c) =
(1 − c
2), then V-ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be higher when c is set to maximize patent pool
revenue. In this case, the royalty will be c = 1
2, both ﬁrms produce 1
4, and total
output is 1
2 which is equal to qV(2
3) + qM(2
3).
Downstream market is oligopolistic
If V- and M-ﬁrms are oligopolists in the product market, their outputs will reﬂect
the strategic interaction. The competition will increase total output given a level
of royalty. This means greater royalty revenue. With a pool, the cost faced by
the two ﬁrms will be identical. However, aggregate output is decreasing in the
common marginal cost. Thus if the optimal royalty level will be lower or higher
is not clear. This means R-ﬁrm is better off with downstream competition but
V-ﬁrm’s pool revenue will increase but production proﬁt may decrease.
When ﬁrms set royalties independently, V-ﬁrm will be able to raise rival cost
by increasing royalty. This gives incentive for V-ﬁrm to raise its own royalty. R-
ﬁrm will be worse off as result and will charge lower royalty in equilibrium since
they are substitutes. V-ﬁrm will be better off since it pays lower royalty.
124 Analysis of RAND Conditions
In this section we explore what the RAND condition achieves, given that the co-
operation among ﬁrms for a standard is secured.
We start with the model with three types of ﬁrms: V, M and R. We now assume
the number of ﬁrms of each type are v, m and r respectively. Both V and M-ﬁrms
must obtain a license from the pool to produce. We denote T-ﬁrm’s output by qT,
price by pT, and proﬁt by πT. Vertical ﬁrm’s proﬁt comes from both royalty and
production:




where Q = vqV + mqM is the total output. M-ﬁrm has no royalty revenue:
πM = (pM − c)qM,





We assume the same type of ﬁrms behave identically.
We consider a two stage game: the royalty fee c is set by the pool in the ﬁrst
stage. In the second stage, ﬁrms that manufacture choose prices (outputs) non-
cooperatively. We assume zero manufacturing cost so that the only cost will be
the license royalty, c. We consider two extreme cases: when products are perfect
substitutes (homogeneous product) and when each ﬁrm is a local monopolist. The
ﬁrst case would correspond to the case where the ﬁrm speciﬁc complementary
assets, i.e. assets complementary to the standard technology such as manufac-
turing know-how, are not important. The second case would correspond to the
case where the standard can support a number of applications for which each ﬁrm
develops specialized complementary assets.9
9Remarks regarding the case of downstream oligopoly at end of previous section would apply
here also.
13Perfect competition in manufacturing
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods results in marginal cost pricing,
pV = pM = c.
Given marginal cost pricing in manufacturing, there is no markup so that there
is no inefﬁciency due to double marginalization when a patent pool is successful
in bundling all complementary patents. In this case, the vertically integrated ﬁrm
gets proﬁt only from R&D, so that there are no divergence of interests between








The pool chooses the royalty rate (c∗) to maximize Qc subject to competition with
alternative standards. The RAND conditions require the pool to apply the rate
c∗ to all licensees. In the case of Bertrand competition in manufacturing, this
nondiscriminatory application of the royalty rate insures the efﬁcient manufactur-
ing. Onlyaﬁrmwiththelowestmanufacturingcostservesthemarket, irrespective
of whether it is an insider or an outsider. It also generates the maximum proﬁt for
R&D. Thus, non-discrimination is feasible and efﬁcient.
Let us go back one step further and consider the member ﬁrm i’s R&D invest-
ment decision (ki). We assume that such investment improves the quality of the





Under the revenue sharing scheme where revenue is divided equally among mem-
bers, each ﬁrm can obtain only one n-th of the increased licensing revenue from
quality improvement of the standard as result of investment. Thus such a scheme
causes a large scale underinvestment in R&D compared to what is collectively
14optimal.10 The degree of underinvestment will be very large when the pool mem-
bership is large. This inefﬁciency obviously handicaps the consortium standard
relative to a closed standard sponsored by a single ﬁrm. The only solution is to
allocate pool revenue according to contribution to the pool revenue. Some scheme
to evaluate the contribution of each patent must be devised to address this underin-
vestment problem. Given such an underinvestment problem, there is no economic
ground for a government to suppress the royalty rate agreed by the pool.11 Such
intervention only exacerbates the underinvestment problem.
Local monopoly
Assume that each ﬁrm serves its own market, i.e., each ﬁrm is a monopolist in its
own market. Each ﬁrm chooses the proﬁt maximization price, for a given royalty
c. Thus there is a positive markup for a manufacturing ﬁrm and for a manufactur-
ing operation of a vertically integrated ﬁrm. Any positive per use charge causes
the problem of double marginalization.
In this case, non-discriminatory licensing does not ensure ex-post manufac-
turing efﬁciency. The perceived marginal cost is lower for an insider vertically
integrated ﬁrm than the outsider manufacturing ﬁrm, since it perceives the gain










Thus, the non-discriminatory application of royalty in fact does not insure the efﬁ-
cient entry in manufacturing. However, the advantage of being an insider becomes
smaller as the number of the members of the patent pool increases. Since a num-
ber of ﬁrms supplying technologies to a patent pool is usually large, this effect
10The benchmark is the investment when the standard is controlled by a single ﬁrm. Such ﬁrm
may overinvest or underinvest in the quality of the standard, depending on the relationship between
the valuation of a marginal consumer and that of a average consumer.
11Note that any dynamic concern of pricing, such as penetration pricing for promoting the dif-
fusion of a standard, can be internalized by a patent pool.
15may be negligible.
Let us look at the determination of the level of royalty. As analyzed in Sec-
tion 3, three types of ﬁrms have different interests regarding the level of royalty,










the minimal price, since the second term does not exist. The insider research ﬁrm
wants a higher price, since there is no ﬁrst term. The vertically integrated ﬁrm
is in the middle ground. It wants to balance its production proﬁt and royalty
revenue. The outcome would mainly depend on the negotiations between insider
manufacturing ﬁrms, and insider research ﬁrms, as well as on competition with
the other standards.
Secondly, higher royalty increases reward to R&D but exacerbates the prob-
lem of double marginalization. The price of zero for technology is the most efﬁ-
cient price ex-post but it gives no return on R&D by research ﬁrms. Thus, there
is a clear trade-off between ex-post efﬁciency and ex-ante incentive. Given the
dilution problem of R&D incentive identiﬁed above, there seems to be no good
ground for a government to suppress the royalty even though it is high due to dou-
ble marginalization. The solution to the tradeoff cannot come from the govern-
ment intervention in pricing. Instead, a lump-sum payment to the insider research
ﬁrm may alleviate the above inefﬁciency. Buy-out of the IPR of the research ﬁrms
would be an alternative, although such ﬁnancing scheme may not be easily avail-
able for a technology coalition.
Whilewediscussedtheeffectonmanufacturingefﬁciencyofnon-discriminatory
licensing policy, we have not discussed why this might be beneﬁcial in the con-
text of dynamic competition. Carlton and Gertner (2003) have argued that one
advantage of an open source system to a proprietary system is that it makes it
possible for anyone to make improvements. The system is able to improve or per-
mutate according to needs more easily. Although a consortium standard depends
16on patented technology, its commitment to give access to anyone who requires at
a “reasonable” price allows outsiders to improve the technology as with the open
system.
5 Conclusion
We have identiﬁed two possible obstacles to a successful implementation patent
pools: free riding and bargaining failure. Once the standard has been established,
itisnotpossibletoexcludeaﬁrmofanessentialpatentfromaccessingthedemand
for the standard (i.e. collecting royalty from the users of the patent). Patents can
only be used to control access to the technologies implementing the standard. We
have shown that the non-cooperative outcomes of licensing are not achievable
by transfer of rents by per patent split. This is because the royalty alone cannot
both increase patent revenue and allocate rents among heterogeneous members
at the same time. Thus, while it is easy to argue why a patent pool bundling
complementary patents are socially desirable, the reality is that patent pools can
be difﬁcult to organize and to maintain.
Our results suggest that both the RAND licensing scheme and the way to al-
locate rents among pool members need to be changed to accommodate the het-
erogeneous membership. The heterogeneity of membership makes the “reason-
able” royalty policy more difﬁcult to implement. This is because the relationship
between royalty rate and revenue differs between research ﬁrms that only have
patent revenue and vertically integrated ﬁrms that also have production proﬁt as
well as patent revenue. One might think that charging sufﬁciently high royalty
will transfer production proﬁt from vertical ﬁrms to research ﬁrms in addition.
Unfortunately this transfer also reduces the size of the total pool revenue by com-
pounding the harm of double-marginalization. Thus it is impossible to transfer
enough revenue to make it proﬁtable for a research ﬁrm to join a pool instead li-
censing independently. This result suggests that there should be extra distribution
to research ﬁrms to compensate for the lack of production proﬁts. Requiring all
17members of the pool to be treated equally could be source of patent pool’s demise.
The current system of allocating pool rents according to patent numbers is
also detrimental to innovation. Firms may signiﬁcantly underinvest in quality of
the standard since it is unable to obtain appropriate return on its R&D investment.
Improving the dynamic incentive of the consortium standard will be important,
since it may have to compete with a closed proprietary standard, which has a
handicap in innovation but has an clear advantage in appropriation.
Finally let us turn to policy issues. Although it is very important for a com-
petition authority to deter the formation of a pools are anticompetitive, it would
be detrimental to competition and innovation for a government to condition the
approval of the pool on low royalty rate. Once the pool is judged to be a bundle
of complementary patents, it should be free to set the royalty rate. On the other
hand, a government intervention may be warranted to prevent the free riding on
the pool by an outsider which surfaces after the standard is set.
18Appendix 1: Recent Standard Patent Pools
Name, Year Admin. Members Licensing Policy Patents Other Info.
MPEG 2,
1997
MPEG LA Originally 13 ﬁrms, 1
university; And any
ﬁrm that has an es-
sential patent can par-
ticipate; currenlty 22
ﬁrms, 1 univ.
1. The contract term is from 10 and a half to 15 and a half years.
2. For MPEG-2 decoding products, the royalty is US $4.00 for each decode
unit. A royalty of US $6 per unit applies to Consumer Products having both
encoding and decoding capabilities. (Both of which prior to Jan. 1, 2002,
and $2.50 from Jan. 1, 2002.) Etc.
3. Licensees have the right to renew for successive ﬁve-year periods for the
life of any MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Patent, subject to reasonable amend-
ment of royalty terms and rates (not to increase by more than 25%).
4. New Licensors and essential patents may be added at no additional cost.
Originally 27 patents; cur-
rently over 640.
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties depends




Philips Philips, Sony, Pioneer 1. The contract term is 10 years.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of 3.5% of the net selling price for
each player sold, subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which drops to
$5 as of Jan. 1, 2000 and $.05 per disc sold.)
3. A most favorable conditions clause.
4. An obligation for licensee to grant-back any essential patent on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
115 patents for the man-
ufacture of DVD players,
95 patents for the manu-
facture of the discs.
Future essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties is not
a function of the number of patents








1. The contracts run until Dec. 31, 2007 and renew automatically for 5-
years terms thereafter.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the
net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty
of $4.00 per player or decoder)
3. A most-favored-nations clause
4. An obligation for licensee to grantback any essential patent on fair, rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory terms.
All the present and future
essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties depends
on the share of patents contributed to
the pool.
Continued on next page.
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19 ﬁrms (8 opera-
tors, 11 manufac-
turers)
1. Maximum Cumulative Royalty is 5%.
2. Standard Royalty Rate per certiﬁed essential patent is 0.1% (However,
the option to negotiate a bi-lateral agreement is available)
All the essential patents of
the member ﬁrms
1. Members able to by-pass and
license independently with mutually
agreeable terms.
2. The allocation of royalties depends
on the share of patents contributed to
the pool.
Source: Nagata(2002); http://www.3gpatents.com; http://www.mpegla.com; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to
Carey R. Ramos, June 10, 1999; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, December 16, 1998.
* The licensing of certiﬁed essential patents will be undertaken by separate licensing companies (”Platform Com-
panies”) which are speciﬁc to a particular radio access technology e.g. W-CDMA, cdma2000, TD-CDMA, etc.
The members of the Platform Companies are the owners of certiﬁed essential patents.
** The Platform Company for the 3G systems based on the W-CDMA technology was formed in September 2003
(PlatformWCDMA Limited or ”PlatformWCDMA”). PlatformWCDMA will offer licenses under the W-CDMA
Patent Licensing Programme which was launched ofﬁcially on the 24 March 2004. The W-CDMA Patent Licensing
Programme became effective 1 January 2004.
2
0Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. When c∗, π∗
R, π∗
V are the patent pool revenue maximizing royalty
and proﬁts, and ˆ cR, ˆ cV, ˆ πR, ˆ πV are equilibrium royalties and proﬁts when R- and
V-ﬁrms set them independently, then
(i) c








V, ˆ πV < ˆ π
∗
V.
Let the inverse demand be P(q). We denote by qm(γ) the monopoly proﬁt
when marginal cost is γ. That is, it is the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition,
max
q (P(q) − γ)q.
We denote by cm, the royalty rate that maximizes revenue γqm(γ). We assume





m(c) ≤ 0, (3)
so that it satisﬁes, the ﬁrst-order condition,
qm(cm) + cmq
0
m(cm) = 0. (4)




















































Proof. It follows from (4) and (5).
The proﬁts when the two ﬁrms set royalties independently are,
π
I
R(cR,cV) = cR (qm(cR + cV) + qm(cR)),
π
I
V(cR,cV) = cVqm(cV + cR) + (P(qm(cR) − cR)qm(cR).
Denote by βR(cV) and βV(cR) the best-response correspondences when ﬁrms set






m(cR + cV) + q
0


























m(cR + cV) + 2q
0
m(cR + cV) + cRq
00
m(cR) + 2 + 2q
0
m(cR) < 0.














m(cR + cV) < 0, so that the ratio must be greater than -1.
Claim 3.
βV(0) = cm, βR(0) = cm.




This is zero from (4) implying βR(0) = cm. Similarly for βV.
Claim 4. (i) cR = βR(cV) intersects the line cR + cV = c∗ below the line
cR = cV (45 degree line).
(ii) cV = βV(cR) intersects the line cR = cV above cR = cV = c∗
2 .
(iii) Intersection of cR = βR(cV) and the line cR = cV is northeast (higher along
the 45 degree line) of intersection of cV = βV(cR) and the line cR = cV.


































The last inequality follows from (5). This implies part (i).
Denote the intersection of cR = βR(cV) and line cR+cV = c∗ by (¯ cR,c∗−¯ cR).
Since this is on βR,
qm(c
∗) + ¯ cRq
0
m(c
∗) + qm(¯ cR) + ¯ cRq
0
m(c
∗) + ¯ cRq
0
m(¯ cR) = 0.
Since ¯ cR < cm, the sum of the last two terms is positive. The sum of the ﬁrst two
terms must be negative and we have



















This implies part (ii).




m(2z) + qm(z) + zq
0
m(z) = 0.




|cR=cV =z = qm(2z) + zq
0
m(2z) < 0.
This shows part (iii).
The proceeding claims are summarized in Figure 2. The part (i) of the propo-
sition follows: Nash Equilibrium lies below the 45 degree line, it is above the line
cR + cV = c∗
2 , and to the left of the point RY .















R(ˆ cR,ˆ cV) + π
I
V(ˆ cR,ˆ cV) = (ˆ cR + ˆ cV)qm(ˆ cR + ˆ cV) + P(qm(ˆ cR))qm(ˆ cR).
Since c∗ < cm, the ﬁrst term is an increasing function on the interval (ˆ cR+ˆ cV,c∗).
The second term is a decreasing function and ˆ cR > c∗
2 . This implies πR(c∗) +
πV(c∗) > πI
R(ˆ cR,ˆ cV) + πI
V(ˆ cR,ˆ cV). This implies ﬁrst inequality of proposition’s
part (ii).
To show the second inequality, ﬁrst we note that πI
V(c
2, c



















V(cR,cV) is decreasing along cR = cV = c
2 (45 degree line). So
proﬁt is lower at the intersection of 45 line and βV than at cR = cV = c∗
2 . Since
πI
V(cR,cV) is decreasing in cR along βV, proﬁt is lower at IE than at the intersec-
tion. Thus we have the second inequality.
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